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INTRODUCTION
ON SEPTEMBER 3, 2003, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced a $40
million settlement with the hedge fund Canary Capital in connection with abusive
trading practices in mutual fund shares of four fund groups.' Specifically, Canary
had allegedly engaged in market timing and late trading and had obtained material
nonpublic information about fund holdings that it used in connection with hedg-
ing transactions.2 The Canary Capital case was only the tip of the iceberg. As it
turns out, it was common among hedge funds and other sophisticated investors to
engage in such practices with the acquiescence and indeed cooperation of mutual
fund advisers. Thus, 176 actions against six fund families were consolidated on
February 20, 2004, for trial in the U.S. District Court in Baltimore as Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL) 1586, with four judges assigned to the cases.' At the time, an
additional 170 cases were pending around the country.4
The problem with these practices is that they reduce the returns for other, long-
term investors. This is fairly intuitive in the case of late trading, which involves
buying or selling fund shares after the market has closed and when new informa-
tion indicates that the closing price of fund shares is too low or too high.5 Market
timing is similar though less obviously abusive.6 In this Article, I explain why these
practices harm individual fund investors, why it matters, and what to do about it.
First, in order to analyze the current controversies, I describe fund structure and
the mechanics of buying and selling fund shares. Second, I describe the abusive
Marbury Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Thomas R. Smith, Jr., Mutual Funds Under Fire: Developments Since January 1, 2003 4 (Oct. 8, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Business 6 Technology Law, University of Maryland School
of Law), available at http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/TRS%2OChronology%20-%20VERSION%2012
%20070105.pdf.
2. Jay G. Baris & Alexandra K. Alberstadt, Fund Managers Face Enforcement Actions and Regulatory Re-
forms, 12 Metropolitan Corp. Couns. No. 4, Apr. 2004, at 12; Richard M. Phillips, The Mutual Fund Market
Timing Scandal-The Impact on Independent Directors 3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of
Business & Technology Law, University of Maryland School of Law).
3. In re Janus Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1360-62 (J.P.M.L. 2004).
4. Id. at 1360 n.5.
5. Roberto M. Braceras, Late Trading and Market Timing, 37 SEC. & COMMODITIEs REc. 61, 62 (2004).
6. Id. at 64.
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trading practices that are at the center of the controversy and explain in detail how
they affect ordinary fund investors in terms of how such practices work and how
much harm they are likely to cause. Third, I discuss a variety of reforms that have
been suggested as ways to prevent such abusive trading practices. Finally, I discuss
the immediate problem of how to resolve the multitude of claims pending against
the mutual fund industry. In particular, I address the difficult questions of whether
these claims should be seen as direct or derivative and why the distinction matters.
I conclude that because of the inherent nature of a mutual fund as a pooled invest-
ment vehicle, there is little choice but to treat such claims as direct claims of indi-
vidual investors. But for handling investor claims, I offer a plan that should
minimize the expenses of administration as well as the dangers of opportunistic
buy-in that would go with derivative recovery. Although the plan involves recovery
by the fund in the first instance, and thus may appear to be inconsistent with
treating investor claims as direct, the plan works through the issuance of additional
fund shares to investors with claims and thus uses the forces of dilution to ensure
that these investors are fairly compensated.
I. FUND STRUCTURE AND TRADING
To understand the abusive mutual fund trading strategies that came to light in
2003, one must first understand how mutual funds are structured and how they
trade. There are two major types of investment companies in the United States. The
term mutual fund usually refers to an open-end fund, that is, a fund that trades with
investors in its own stock:7 It sells its own stock to investors who want to invest and
buys (redeems) its own stock from investors who want to cash out.8 Thus, with an
open-end fund, the number of shares outstanding changes continuously-hence
the name. A closed-end fund is one that issues some fixed number of shares in a
public offering.9 Those shares trade just like shares in any other corporation and
may be listed on an exchange."5 Thus, an investor who wants to buy into a closed-
end fund must buy shares from another investor in an ordinary exchange-executed
trade." The current controversies relate exclusively to open-end companies. Ac-
cordingly, in this Article I use the term mutual fund in its strict sense to refer to
open-end investment companies only.
As for structure, most funds (of both types) consist of two separate entities. The
fund itself is a corporation or business trust or similar entity that holds the securi-
7. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2004 MUTUAL FUND FACTBOOK 12 (44th ed. 2004).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., ABA Section of Business Law, Fund Director's Guidebook, 59 Bus. LAW.
201, 206 (2003).
11. Id. at 254- 55. As of 2005, there are 480 closed-end funds listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), or about one of every six companies listed there. New York Stock Exchange, Closed-End Funds, at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=marketinfol169181586532.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
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ties and cash that constitute the investment portfolio. 2 Although the fund has a
board of directors and nominal officers, it usually employs no active managers.
Rather, the fund contracts with a separate entity, the fund adviser, to manage the
fund. In exchange for managing the fund, the adviser is typically paid some speci-
fied percentage of fund assets annually. 3 The fund is regulated under the federal
Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), and to some extent by the state law under
which the entity is organized. 4 The adviser is regulated under the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940, which also regulates investment advisers who deal with individ-
ual clients."
As for trading, unlike stocks that trade continuously during the day, and indeed
twenty-four hours a day, mutual fund shares are priced once a day at 4:00 p.m.
(EST) on the basis of the fund's net asset value (NAV) per share. 6 In theory, NAV is
the actual value of the stocks and cash in the fund-less fund liabilities-divided
by the number of shares outstanding, all as priced at market close in New York.' 7
Anyone who wants to buy or sell mutual fund shares must place an order before
4:00 p.m.'8 The fund itself fills all such orders at NAV, deducting any fees for the
transaction. In other words, an investor who buys fund shares buys new shares
issued by the fund directly from the fund, and an investor who sells fund shares
sells them directly to the fund, which has agreed to buy back its own shares once a
day at NAV. Thus, investing in a mutual fund is clearly different from investing in a
normal business corporation.
This is a simple system for investors who place orders directly with the fund. But
most funds also market their shares through brokerage firms in order to reach the
largest possible market. The problem is that brokers need time to convey their
customer orders to the fund itself. In order to accommodate this relay of orders, it
was standard practice, before the Canary Capital incident, to permit brokers to
place orders as late as 5:30 p.m.'9 The alternative would have been to require bro-
kerage customers to place fund orders before some cutoff time earlier than 4:00
p.m. in order to give the broker the time to relay the order by the 4:00 p.m. dead-
12. Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., supra note 10, at 208.
13. Some closed-end funds are unmanaged. That is, the fund invests in a fixed portfolio at inception and
refrains from trading thereafter. Such a fund is often called a unit investment trust (UIT). Other closed-end
funds may engage in more or less active trading during the life of the fund. Many closed-end funds and all
UITs have limited lives. In other words, they must be dissolved and liquidated after a specified number of years.
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 12.
14. The Investment Company Act is also known as the 1940 Act and is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to
80a-64. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to 80a-64 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
15. The Investment Advisers Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21. See generally 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (2000).
16. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 17.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. at 17.
19. See Christopher Oster & Tom Lauricella, Making the Case to Defend Trading Practices, WALL ST. J., Apr.
12, 2004, at Cl.
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line. Of course, this procedure would mean that brokerage customers were at a
distinct disadvantage compared with customers who dealt directly with the fund.
Thus, in order to make the rules at the retail level consistent for all investors, bro-
kers were given extra time to relay orders to the funds, presumably with the under-
standing that their customers would place their orders by the 4:00 p.m. deadline. It
is difficult to believe that brokers would need until 5:30 p.m. to complete this
mechanical task, but the idea of allowing extra time at least makes some sense.
II. ABUSIVE TRADING PRACTICES
Accommodations for brokers begat trading opportunities for hedge funds. NAV is
calculated as of 4:00 p.m. But a lot can happen between 4:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m.20
One obvious example is that many companies wait until the market closes to make
significant announcements. The idea is that the market will have time to digest the
information and will react more rationally the following morning.
Suppose that Acme Fireworks Corp. closes at $30.00. Immediately after the clos-
ing bell, Binford Tools Co. announces that it is making a tender offer for Acme at
$50.00. It seems clear that Acme shares will rise substantially when the market
opens the following day. If PrettyBig Fund is known to own a significant number of
Acme shares, and if the fund's shares are priced solely according to NAV calculated
on the basis of closing market prices, then those shares are underpriced. An un-
scrupulous broker may thus place an order to buy fund shares after hearing the
news, knowing for certain that NAV is too low.
The effect of the tender offer on the NAV of PrettyBig Fund shares is likely to be
small. Assuming that Acme accounts for one percent of fund holdings and assum-
ing that Acme stock rises to, say, $45.00 as a result of the tender offer, NAV should
be 0.5% higher. In other words, if fund shares are priced at $20.00 per share based
on closing prices, the correct price should be $20.10. Nevertheless, one could make
a substantial profit by buying a large number of shares. For example, by purchasing
$20 million worth of fund shares and selling them the following day, one could
expect a gain of $100,000. On the other hand, if fund shares fall by 0.5% the fol-
lowing day (because of other factors), the entire gain will be wiped out. One may
even suffer a loss. It may of course be possible to lock in today's selling price by
means of a short sale, put option, or some similar device. 2' But it is not clear that
such devices are commonly available in connection with mutual fund shares. Nev-
ertheless, even if one cannot hedge away the risk that the market may fall the fol-
lowing day, it seems almost certain that the ability to enter late trades will be quite
profitable over time. After all, it is equally possible on any given day that the market
20. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 17.
21. See generally ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS
§§ 14.19, 15.1-15.2 (3d ed. 2002); Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutral-
ity, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 812 (2000).
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will rise the following day. Thus, over the long haul and over many such trades, one
would expect market movements to net out so that profits from late trading would
almost certainly come close to the aggregate discrepancies between calculated NAV
and true NAV.
To be sure, one must know what stocks are held in a fund portfolio in order for
this strategy to work. The problem is that funds typically keep their holdings secret,
because to disclose holdings may reveal investment and trading strategies to com-
petitors. Accordingly, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules do not re-
quire disclosure of current fund holdings in prospectuses or periodic reports to
investors. Rather, SEC rules permit funds to disclose their holdings as of sixty days
before the date of the prospectus or report.2 SEC rules do not prohibit disclosure
of fund holdings, but disclosure may nonetheless be a breach of the funds' own
rules or representations. 3
To see how ordinary investors are harmed by late trading, consider the following
example. PrettyBig Fund holds $2 billion in stocks and has 100 million shares out-
standing at a NAV of $20.00 per share. PrettyBig's investments are spread equally
over 100 stocks. That is, PrettyBig has $20 million invested in each stock in its
portfolio. One of those stocks is Acme Fireworks, which becomes the target of a
tender offer as in the example above. Thus, although PrettyBig's calculated NAV is
$20.00 per share, its true value is $20.10 per share. HedgeHog Investors buys 1
22. This time lag is the result of rules that permit registration statements and periodic reports to include
information that is no more than sixty days old. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.30e-l(d) (2004). Many funds voluntarily
provide information that is more current. See Survey of Fund Groups' Portfolio Disclosure Policies Summary of
Results, at http://www.ici.orgstatements/cmltrOl1secportdisclos-surv.html# (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
23. It is worth noting that if one knows which stocks are held in a fund's portfolio, it may also be possible
to use the fund portfolio as part of various hedging strategies such as program trading. Indeed, Canary Capital
reportedly engaged in hedging strategies using information about fund holdings, in addition to late trading and
market timing. These strategies are distinct from late trading and market timing and arguably are less harmful
to nontrading fund investors, at least in any direct way. There is, however, a definite advantage in using mutual
fund shares for this purpose in that fund shares can be traded without incurring fees. Ordinary investors often
must pay a fee either up front or on the back end if they sell too soon. On the other hand, shares often may be
traded fee-free with a fund family, and institutional shares may often be traded fee-free within a large group of
funds (a fund supermarket). Therefore, it is unclear that permitting frequent trading is technically a breach of
fund rules, though clearly it violates the spirit of the rules that are intended to permit trading primarily in
retirement accounts. Ironically, firms that engage in program trading sometimes see themselves as providing a
service to mutual funds by cleaning up or eliminating (technical) price discrepancies that may be caused by
large volume trades made by mutual funds. Thus, one could even argue that the use of fund shares for hedging
is part of the cost of running a fund, or indeed that a fund benefits because such arbitrage had the effect of
muting the price effects of the fund's own trading. Thus, it has been argued by some commentators that market
timing should not be seen as an abuse. E.g., Henry G. Manne, What Mutual Fund Scandal?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,
2004, at A22. On the other hand, to the extent that there is money to be made from such strategies, one could
argue that the funds have a duty to capture the profit for the benefit of fund investors if only as a way of
supplementing adviser compensation and possibly reducing fees. The problem is that if funds themselves en-
gage in the business of arbitrage, there would be a danger that funds would engage in trading as a way of
creating arbitrage opportunities, which would probably constitute manipulation. Thus, arranging with an
outside firm in effect to make a capital contribution to the fund in exchange for arbitrage privileges may be the
second-best solution. See generally Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Also Stalking the Fund Industry: Obsolescence, WALL
ST. I.. Dec. 10. 2003. at A19.
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million fund shares for $20 million in a late trade. As a result, the value of the fund
immediately increases to $2,020,000,000. The next day, the value of the fund fur-
ther increases by $10 million because of the run-up in the value of Acme stock held
in the portfolio. The fund is now worth $2,030,000,000. Each fund share is worth
$2,030 / 101 or $20.0990 per share (assuming no other changes in market prices
and assuming that NAV is calculated to four decimals). HedgeHog now sells its
shares and in effect withdraws $20,099,000 from the fund. Assuming that no other
fund investors trade, the fund is now worth $2,009,900,000 and each remaining
share is worth $2,009.90 / 100 or $20.099 instead of $20.10. Each fund investor has
lost one-tenth of a cent per share compared to the NAV that would have obtained
in the absence of late trading. HedgeHog has made $99,000 on the trade, which is
equivalent to an annual return of 124%. Investors are unlikely to notice the differ-
ence because they do not know how many Acme shares were in the PrettyBig port-
folio.24 Moreover, if the fund manager is compensated at the annual rate of one
percent of fund assets, the manager stands to make an additional $200,000 in fees.2"
The following table shows the effect of HedgeHog's late trading.
TOTAL ASSETS SHARES OUT NAV / SHARE
BEGIN $2,000,000,000 100,000,000 $2o.oooooooo
HEDGEHOG
BUYS +20,000,000 1,000,000
Subtotal 2,020,000,000 101,000,000 20.00000000
ACME OFFER
ANNOUNCED +10,000,000
Subtotal 2,030,000,000 101,000,000 20.09901000
HEDGEHOG SELLS -20,099,010 -1,000,000
Subtotal 2,009,900,990 100,000,000 20.09900990
WITHOUT
HEDGEHOG 2,010,000,000 100,000,000 20.10000000
TRADES
Difference 99,010 .00099000
Market timing is less clearly abusive than late trading, although it probably
causes just as much harm to nontrading fund investors. Market timing depends on
finding stocks that will be mispriced when NAV is calculated. For example, the
24. The strategy works equally well in the case of bad news about a portfolio company, except that the
late-trading fund investor sells fund shares in the first instance.
25. Advisory fees and 12b-I fees, if any, are accrued daily on the basis on NAV, which makes it doubly
important that NAV is accurately calculated. See Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., supra note 10, at 233.
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Tokyo Stock Market closes at 1:00 a.m. and reopens at 7:00 p.m. (EST).26 Most
funds that invest in Japanese stocks base NAV on actual closing prices even though
the prices are fifteen hours old and even though the price may clearly be inaccurate.
For example, it may be well known that Japanese auto stocks are likely to rise if U.S.
auto stocks rise. Thus, if U.S. auto stocks rise dramatically during the day, one
could invest in a fund known to include Japanese auto stocks. Although there is no
gain from the run-up in U.S. prices because U.S. stocks will be accurately reflected
in NAV, a savvy trader can capture the gain from the likely run-up in Japanese
stocks. This strategy does not depend on late trading. It works simply because the
fund uses stale prices for its Japanese stocks. Market timing is a particular problem
with country funds-that is, funds that invest more or less exclusively in the stocks
of particular foreign countries-where the entire stock market can often be ex-
pected to rise or fall in reaction to broad movements in the U.S. market. Still,
market timing, like late trading, can also be profitable in connection with domestic
funds that hold some foreign stocks if one knows what stocks are held in what
amount in the fund portfolio. In any event, the harm to nontrading investors is the
same as with late trading.
It is not clear that there is anything particularly reprehensible about trading on
such knowledge. Arguably, it is the funds that should do something to prevent such
strategies. The real problem is stale pricing.27 Indeed, in the 1990s many funds did
attempt to prevent market timing by engaging in so-called fair value pricing, that is,
by calculating NAV on the basis of what foreign stocks and some other securities
were likely to be worth according to pricing models designed to adjust for known
relationships.28 Oddly enough, many investors objected to fair value pricing, pre-
sumably because of worry that such models could be manipulated. Most funds
abandoned the practice, possibly because advisers discovered coincidentally that
they could woo hedge fund investors with such opportunities.2 9
III. REGULATORY FIXES
The obvious solution for late trading is to require all orders to buy or sell fund
shares to be submitted to the fund itself by 4:00 p.m. Indeed, this solution-known
as a hard close-was the primary regulatory fix that was proposed in the wake of
26. The Tokyo Stock Exchange is open for trading from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. (Japanese standard time)
(with a break for lunch), which converts to 7:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. (EST). See Nikkei Net Interactive, Company
Watch, at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/FR/SERV/help/hlpinvst.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
27. See Andy Kessler, Get Real (Time), WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2003, at A18. Some have even argued that
market timing serves a useful purpose by arbitraging away discrepancies between NAV and FMV and thus that
fund investors suffer no real harm from the practice. See Manne, supra note 23, at A22.
28. See Barbash Says Rules for Share Pricing Not Likely to See Basic Changes, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1709, 1714-15 (1997).
29. See SEC Staff Calls for Greater Use of Fair Value Pricing in NAV Calculation, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 709, 709-10 (2001).
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the mutual fund scandals." The obvious problem with this solution is that it cre-
ates difficulties for honest investors who trade through brokers and in particular
for investors whose retirement savings are typically captive to such arrangements. It
is not clear, however, that such investors-who are in the market for the long
haul-should care much about the requirement that they submit orders by noon
or 2:00 p.m. Presumably few such investors engage in active trading. Arguably none
should do so, although it is quite clear that the fund supermarket model is designed
to maximize choice and facilitate switching. On the other hand, even long-term
investors may prefer to wait until as late in the day as possible to place an order so
as to avoid the risk that the market will move against them after an order is placed
but before it is actually executed." At the very least, one can imagine that an inves-
tor would be irked to know that after placing an order to buy, the market rose
during the next few hours and the order was executed at a higher-than-expected
price. Such an investor might think that she had effectively lost the difference.
Therefore, permitting trading until the bitter end may maximize investor faith in
the system even if ultimately there is no rational basis for any such effect. 2
Although the hard close may be a good idea, it does nothing to address market
timing. And it does not ultimately address the fundamental reasons for the abusive
trading practices that have come to light since September 2003. Without more basic
reforms, these forces are likely to manifest themselves in some other way in the
30. Phillips, supra note 2, at 5-6.
31. It is not clear that an investor would know or care about how market swings would affect alternative
funds with the same focus as in the case of two different large cap funds. But an investor might well know from
readily available market indices that large cap funds are up or down versus small cap funds and may reallocate
funds accordingly.
32. In addition to the proposed hard dose, the SEC proposed a rule imposing a two percent fee in connec-
tion with the purchase and sale of fund shares within a five-day period and also proposed additional disclosures
in connection with market-timing policies, fair value pricing, and disclosure of portfolio information. See
Phillips, supra note 2, at 7-8. As for the redemption fee, it seems unlikely to have much effect because there is
no need to sell fund shares immediately in order for the strategy to be successful. See Mark Hulbert, Why an
SEC Hurdle Won't Stop Fund Speculators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at B6. Ultimately, the SEC adopted a rule
permitting funds to impose such fees (over and above normal redemption charges depending on fund class)
together with a rule that requires funds to have agreements with intermediaries that permits monitoring of
market timing as well as enforcement of redemption fees, if any. See Rachel McTague, SEC Gives Funds Re-
demption Fee Option, But Requires Contracts With Intermediaries, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 393, 393-94
(2005). Proposals regarding additional disclosure of fund holdings have been met with skepticism. See Letter
from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 5, 2004), at http://www.ici.org/statements/cmltr/2004/04 secmkt_
timing-com.html. But some funds have voluntarily undertaken to disclose holdings more often and more
quickly. See, e.g., Janus to Pay Fund Shareholders $31 Million for Harm from Market Timing, 36 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1, 6 (2004). Ultimately, the SEC adopted a rule requiring fund disclosure of policies regarding
disclosure of holdings. See Rachel McTague, SEC Adopts Rule to Boost Disclosure by Funds on Timing, Portfolio
Holdings, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 701, 705-06 (2004). In addition to these reforms, the SEC has proposed
a variety of reforms relating to director independence and sales and distribution practices. Phillips, supra note
2, at 17, 19. Many of these reforms address long-standing issues that are not obviously related to late trading
and market timing, but it is arguable that distribution of funds through brokers ultimately gave rise to trading
opportunities either directly in the case of late trading or indirectly in the case of both late trading and market
timing (by permitting funds to cover their tracks with legitimate orders).
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future. As it turns out, mutual fund managers apparently knew about these prac-
tices. Historically, funds had dealt harshly with market timing and other forms of
active trading. Such investors were barred by many funds when they were discov-
ered, while other funds engaged in fair value pricing in order to eliminate trading
opportunities, at least until investors shouted down such pricing practices. By 2003,
however, many fund managers did little, if anything, to stop active traders. Indeed,
fund managers may have encouraged these practices because of the compensation
system. In effect, the opportunity to engage in market timing and late trading
seems to have been used to attract large investments from hedge fund investors so
as to increase the size of the fund and the compensation of the fund adviser. In
short, fund managers may have been in cahoots with late traders."
It seems unlikely that late trading would have been a problem if it had not been
for the practice of selling fund shares through brokers. Although it seems only
natural for a fund to want to reach the largest possible market, the most powerful
reason for seeking broad distribution is that fund managers are invariably compen-
sated by a percentage of fund assets. The bigger the fund, the bigger the paycheck,
other things being equal.34 Selling through brokers also gives rise to a wide variety
of other potentially abusive practices. For example, a fund manager may in effect
bribe brokers to sell his fund by paying large commissions, which in turn may color
the judgment and advice of the broker in making recommendations to his clients.
In addition, selling through brokers exacerbates the use of soft-dollar compensation
arrangements. For example, a fund manager may agree to pay higher-than-neces-
sary brokerage fees to a broker that sells more of the fund shares. Such practices are
prohibited by statute except in exchange for services that are not commercially
available from other sources.35
Trading abuses are also due in part to the peculiar fact that funds are separate
from their advisers. Again, technically speaking, a mutual fund is a corporation
that is separate from the fund adviser. The fund is simply a corporation formed to
hold a portfolio of stocks. The adviser is a separate entity that contracts with the
fund to provide management services. The fund pays the manager some specified
percentage of assets per year as a management fee. If a mutual fund were one with
33. In all fairness, once these practices became common, it may have been necessary for reluctant funds to
go along simply in order to avoid losing large investors. That, too, may explain the remarkable shift from the
hostility to active trading that was standard in the early 1990s.
34. Interestingly, active trading strategies have not been a problem in the European Union (EU). See
remarks of Margaret Bancroft. It may be that because funds in the EU are viewed as a product of the adviser,
who, accordingly, has a financial interest in the performance of the fund. Presumably, a fund company can
justify higher fees if the fund performs better, and that may induce fund managers to be more vigilant about
such practices as late trading and market timing. But U.S. law prohibits fees based directly on performance. See
15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2000). Which system is preferable is open to debate. Fund expenses appear to be about fifty
percent higher in the EU, but U.S. funds bear significant expenses in addition to advisory fees that EU funds
may not incur. See Karen Damato et al., Do Mutual Funds Really Need Directors?, WALL ST. 1., June 7, 2004, at
RI.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000).
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its adviser, it seems unlikely that fund management would sit idly by while some
opportunistic investor siphoned off profits. Moreover, and more basically, it is dif-
ficult to see how the adviser could be compensated in the standard way with a
percentage of fund assets. To be sure, individual managers could be paid a percent-
age of fund assets or a salary with a bonus based on the growth of the fund, or
managers might be paid with options on fund shares as is common among other
types of corporations. This would have been a powerful incentive to monitor late
trading and market timing.
The problem is that federal securities law and SEC rules effectively dictate the
current structure on the theory that the fund ought to be able to change manage-
ment if the board of directors becomes dissatisfied with management performance.
Of course, that never happens. Instead, most investors seem to view mutual funds
as products created and offered by the adviser, and investors choose their funds
accordingly.36 There have been attempts in the past to wrest control of funds from
their advisers-without much success-but it seems more efficient for investors to
vote with their feet. After all, investors can effectively force the progressive dissolu-
tion of a fund simply by redeeming their shares and investing the proceeds
elsewhere. 7
In addition, federal securities law severely restricts compensation of fund manag-
ers on the basis of investment performance. 8 The rationale for this prohibition is
not entirely clear, but it may have been that the framers of federal securities law
thought that such compensation arrangements might induce fund managers to un-
dertake too much risk on behalf of the fund. It may also be that the prohibition has
persisted because of the efficient market theory.39
In theory, funds could be limited to direct sales, but such a rule might make it
difficult for smaller funds to gain access to a wide market. It is also important to
note that brokers must agree under NASD rules not to maintain a secondary mar-
ket in mutual fund shares. Although this may seem to be an odd restriction, it is
presumably designed to prevent avoidance of sales and redemption fees.4"
36. Remarks of Frank Partnoy. See Karen Damato et al., Do Mutual Funds Really Need Directors?, WALL ST.
I., June 7, 2004, at R1.
37. There is a limit to this process, though. As a fund is forced to sell its holdings in order to redeem its
own shares, it is likely to sell the most liquid holdings first. As fund holdings become less liquid, sales by the
fund have a greater effect on the primary market for the shares the fund holds, thus driving down NAV faster
and faster. In other words, as with a run on the bank, the first few investors are likely to get out without much
difficulty, but other investors may be induced to get out purely for strategic reasons.
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2000).
39. Moreover, with recent doubts that have been raised about the use of stock options as compensation, it
seems unlikely that reformers would favor the use of options as compensation in the fund industry.
40. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 697, 708-09, 711 (1975) (finding no
violation of antitrust law in this arrangement). See also Rachel McTague, SEC Gives Funds Redemption Fee
Option, But Requires Contracts With Intermediaries, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 393, 393 (2005).
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IV. SORTING OUT PRIVATE CLAIMS
Whether or not regulators manage to fix the problems with mutual fund structure
and practices that gave rise to abuses, the courts must sort out the avalanche of
private claims made by fund investors. It should be clear at this point that late
trading and market timing reduce returns for nontrading fund investors. Thus, the
private civil actions arising as a result of these abuses seek (i) compensation for
losses suffered by nontrading fund investors or recoupment of gains extracted by
hedge funds and others who engaged in abusive trading and (ii) disgorgement of
fees collected by fund advisers as a result of increases in fund assets under manage-
ment that came from facilitating abusive trading practices.' There is little doubt
that there is a private cause of action for these claims.42 But it is unclear whether
the claims belong to individual investors or to the funds themselves-that is,
whether these claims are direct or derivative.43
A. Distinguishing Direct and Derivative Claims
The characterization of claims as direct or derivative is important. If an action is
classified as direct, the stockholders should ordinarily recover individually, and re-
covery may be limited to those stockholders who sold their shares at depressed
prices. Also, their recovery might be at the expense of the fund itself, which would
cause further harm to nonselling fund stockholders, as in the case of an ordinary
securities-fraud class action.4 If an action is classified as derivative, the corporation
should ordinarily recover, and its recovery should extend to all of the illicit profits
and fees. Thus, the potential for recovery (and the potential for attorney fees) is
41. If the increase in fees is attributable solely to additional fund assets under management, the increase in
fees is effectively paid by the traders and should not result in any reduction in value for ordinary fund inves-
tors. That would seem to suggest that actions based on such claims should be dismissed for lack of any allega-
tion of damages. (It is difficult to believe that traders did not profit in excess of the fees they paid, although it is
possible that they figured out some way to escape paying fees by timing purchases and sales of fund shares.) On
the other hand, if the fund adviser is seen as a fiduciary, extra fees may be recouped as secret profits.
42. See Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 175 (2d Cir. 2002). The financial claims made in these cases are
primarily claims based on familiar principles of securities fraud or breach of fiduciary duty or contract.
43. Interestingly, the actions consolidated in MDL 1586 were divided almost evenly between direct actions
and derivative actions. In other words, about half of the actions sought recovery on behalf of the fund, and
about half of the actions sought recovery on behalf of individual investors. It is unclear which characterization
is correct. Each of the four tracks to which the cases have been assigned has a lead plaintiff attorney for the
direct actions and a lead plaintiff attorney for the derivative actions. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig. (D. Md.
May 25, 2004) (case management order), http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/MDLLitigation/MDLDocs/mfcmol
reorgstructure.pdf. See also In re Janus Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (J.P.M.L. 2004). On August
25, 2005, Judge J. Frederick Motz dismissed the state and federal derivative claims except for the federal claim
relating to excessive fees under ICA § 36(b) in one of the several subtracks under MDL 1586 on the grounds
that the plaintiffs had failed to make a demand on the board of directors of the subject funds. In re Mut. Funds
Inv. Litig. 384 F. Supp. 2d 873, 875 (D. Md. 2005). As the decision notes, demand is not required for claims
under ICA § 36(b). Id. As I discuss further below, Judge Motz did not decide whether the claims were direct or
derivative.
44. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, BERKELEY Bus. L.J.
(forthcoming).
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much greater under a derivative theory than it is under a direct theory, other things
being equal. On the other hand, if an action is treated as derivative, it is subject to a
variety of procedural hurdles and may ultimately be captured and possibly even
dismissed by the fund board of directors.4"
The determination whether an action is direct or derivative is one for the court.
The characterization of the action by the parties is not binding.46 Moreover, the
determination whether an action is direct or derivative is generally governed by the
law of the state of incorporation of the fund.47 Thus, although the mutual fund
actions are pending in federal court, state law likely will govern the characterization
of these actions except to the extent that a cause of action involves an overriding
federal policy.4" Still, even if the rules relating to the choice of law are clear, classifi-
cation of the actions as direct or derivative can present difficult questions.
In an archetypical derivative action, the stockholder is injured because the cor-
poration suffers some injury that causes the stock price to fall or otherwise causes a
loss in the value of the corporation.49 For example, the corporation may have suf-
fered a loss through mismanagement or self-dealing on the part of a director or
officer. The primary injury is one to the corporation. The injury to the stockholder
is derivative. The injury does not flow directly to the stockholder. Rather, the stock-
holder suffers the injury as a result of the market's reaction to the injury to the
corporation, usually in the form of a decrease in market price.
In contrast, in a direct action the stockholder suffers injury in connection with
some right the stockholder possesses as against the corporation, such as the right to
vote, the right to receive a dividend, or a contractual right." Indeed, the corpora-
45. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1979). This would seem to be a particular danger in
connection with the instant cases, because by law, fund boards contain a majority of independent directors. As
the Delaware Supreme Court stated,
Determining whether an action is derivative or direct is sometimes difficult and has many legal
consequences, some of which may have an expensive impact on the parties to the action. For exam-
ple, if an action is derivative, the plaintiffs are then required to comply with the requirements of
Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, that the stockholder: (a) retain ownership of the shares throughout the
litigation; (b) make presuit demand on the board; and (c) obtain court approval of any settlement.
Further, the recovery, if any, flows only to the corporation. The decision whether a suit is direct or
derivative may be outcome-determinative. Therefore, it is necessary that a standard to distinguish
such actions be clear, simple and consistently articulated and applied by our courts.
Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004). Moreover, there are procedural
requirements unique to both types of claims that need to be satisfied early on in the litigation in order to reach
a result that will stick on appeal. For example, in a class action, the class must be certified and all members
must be notified. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
46. Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1035.
47. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991); Strougo, 282 F.3d at 167.
48. See generally, 500 U.S. at 108; Strougo, 282 F.3d at 169. Although the law varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, most of the funds involved in MDL 1586 are incorporated in Delaware, Maryland, or Massachu-
setts. The law in these states, as well as federal law, is largely consistent. See generally In re Mut. Funds Inv.
Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Md. 2005).
49. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.01 (1994).
50. Id.
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tion itself need not suffer any injury. For example, the stockholder may have been
forced in the context of a merger to sell or trade his shares for too little considera-
tion."' Arguably, the corporation is unharmed except in some vague reputational
sense.
Some cases are difficult to categorize because they fall in the middle or may have
elements of both types of claims. For example, if a stockholder has been deprived of
value because of dilution resulting from the improper issuance of stock by the
corporation, the claim could be characterized either as direct or derivative. Suppose
the corporation issues a large block of shares at a bargain price. The corporation is
harmed because it receives less for the shares than it should have received. The old
stockholders are harmed because their percentage of ownership and voting rights is
reduced, in addition to the fact that the price has probably declined from dilution.
Although this latter form of harm may at first seem to be the same sort of reduc-
tion in value that comes from a mismanagement or self-dealing claim, it is some-
what different in that different shareholders are in different positions. The old
stockholders suffer dilution, but the new stockholder who buys at a bargain price
does not.
Most courts have ruled that dilution claims are derivative.52 But some courts
have suggested that an action should be regarded as direct rather than derivative if
various classes of shareholders suffer different sorts of harm. 3 For example, in the
dilution case above, one might argue that old stockholders suffer harm while new
stockholders enjoy a benefit. On the other hand, one might argue that this distinc-
tion is illusory in that only those who were stockholders at the time of the harm to
the corporation have standing to sue. 4 The problem, however, is that with a deriva-
tive action, the corporation recovers and all stockholders (new and old) benefit
51. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864-70 (Del. 1985),
52. See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 349 (Del. 1988); Elster v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 100 A.2d
219, 223 (Del. Ch. 1953).
53. See In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 330 (Del. 1993); Lipton v. News Int'l, PLC, 514
A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1986); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. 1970); Moran v. Household Int'l.,
Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985) (specifying that a special injury is a wrong that "is separate and
distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, or a wrong involving a contractual right of a shareholder,
such as the right to vote, or to assert majority control, which exists independently of any right of the corpora-
tion") (citation omitted), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
54. It is also arguable that the wrong occurs at the time the decision is made to issue the new stock. One
can easily conceive of cases in which existing stockholders are treated differently. For example, suppose that a
fund offers to sell new shares to existing stockholders at a bargain price. Fund stockholders who fail to buy
additional shares will suffer dilution, but those who buy will not. Thus, some fund stockholders suffer harm
while others enjoy a benefit. Although it might be argued that all stockholders are in the same position but for
their own choice in how to respond to the offer, it might also be argued that the harm consists of making a
coercive offer to fund stockholders and thereby threatening them with unequal treatment, both of which claims
appear to be direct. Moreover, the corporation suffers no harm in such a case and arguably enjoys a benefit.
For a discussion of these issues, see Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2002). One nice question
in such a case is whether the stockholders have standing to sue the board of directors directly for a breach of
fiduciary duty or whether the board of directors owes its duty to the corporation. Delaware seems to regard
such a claim as direct and actionable. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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even though the plaintiff must be an old stockholder. All will end up treated
equally if the corporation recovers from the new stockholder, but that is unlikely to
happen in a dilution case." One way to deal with this problem is for the court to
order individual recovery for the benefit of old stockholders only. 6 Many courts,
however, are reluctant to resort to this remedy.
5 7
In Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court re-
jected the special injury rationale as unduly confusing." Instead, the court held that
"Itlhe analysis must be based solely on the following questions: Who suffered the
alleged harm-the corporation or the suing stockholder individually-and who
would receive the benefit of the recovery or other remedy [the corporation or the
stockholders, individually] ?""s As the court itself noted, this is essentially the test set
forth in the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance (PCG):6 °
A direct action may be brought in the name and right of a holder to redress an
injury sustained by, or enforce a duty owed to, the holder. An action in which
the holder can prevail without showing an injury or breach of duty to the
corporation should be treated as a direct action that may be maintained by the
holder in an individual capacity.61
The court also emphasized that unless the plaintiffs can show a separate right in the
nature of a contractual right, the action should be characterized as derivative.62
Thus, although the decision in Tooley may have clarified the law, it may also have
set up a strong presumption in favor of characterizing doubtful cases as derivative
rather than direct. Specifically, Tooley seems to hold that an action can be classified
as direct only if a claim can be established without reference to an injury to the
corporation." In other words, if a claim can be characterized as both derivative and
direct, Tooley seems to require that it be characterized as derivative.
In contrast, the PCG clearly contemplates that some cases may give rise to both
direct and derivative actions.64 The PCG also states that in such cases, the rules
relating to each type of action should be applied only to the claims so character-
55. In a dilution case, the new stockholder will likely be protected by statute. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 6.30 (2002). Thus, if anyone is held liable, it is likely to be the board of directors that issued the stock on the
cheap, in which case the new stockholders will enjoy a windfall.
56. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.18(e) (1994).
57. Id. § 7.16. For example, the Supreme Court rejects the possibility of individual recovery in a situation
in which recovery by the corporation would result in gain by a party involved in wrongdoing (such as one
involving dilution). Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974).
58. 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del. 2004).
59. Id. at 1035.
60. Id. at 1036 n.9.
61. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.01 (1994). See Grimes v.
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996); Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1122 (Del. Ch. 2004).
62. See Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1039.
63. id.
64. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.01 (1994).
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ized.6 The potential problem with the approach announced in Tooley is that Dela-
ware does not appear to permit individual recovery in a derivative action under any
circumstances.66 The PCG, on the other hand, expressly contemplates individual
recovery in appropriate circumstances. As a result, the possibility that recovery by
the corporation might lead to undercompensation of old stockholders and a wind-
fall gain to new stockholders can be addressed when it arises under the PCG, but it
may be ignored under Delaware law.
B. Application in the Mutual Fund Context
It is not self-evident how these principles should be applied in the context of claims
by fund investors based on abusive trading of mutual fund shares by other inves-
tors. It is clear, however, that a decision must be made relatively early in a case
because numerous procedural issues hinge on the outcome. Undoubtedly the most
important implication of the decision is that if an action is deemed to be derivative,
the subject fund may be able to take control of the litigation as the true plaintiff
and possibly even to seek dismissal of the action as contrary to the best interests of
the fund.68
At first blush, one would think that claims in connection with abusive trading of
mutual fund shares are derivative. Such trades have the effect of reducing the value
of the fund. Fund shares are thus reduced in value, and fund investors suffer as a
result-much as they do in a dilution case. In the case of an ordinary business
corporation, such circumstances clearly give rise to a derivative claim. But for the
65. Id.
66. Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1039.
67. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.01 (1994).
68. See id. §§ 7.05-7.13 (1994). As noted above, in MDL 1586 the court dismissed the state and federal
derivative claims except for the federal claim relating to excessive fees under ICA § 36(b) on the grounds that
the plaintiffs had failed to make a demand on the board of directors of the subject funds. In re Mut. Funds Inv.
Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 873, 875 (D. Md. 2005). In his decision dismissing the Janus derivative claims for failure
to make demand, Judge Motz noted that if the derivative claims had not been dismissed, it would have been
necessary to accelerate the decision as to whether the claims were properly characterized as direct or derivative.
Id. at 876. It is not clear, however, why it is necessary to undertake such an inquiry as to the direct class action
claims. After all, it may be that such claims should be characterized as derivative. Moreover, it seems at least
arguable that one could treat the derivative complaint as a demand on the board. To be sure, that would
effectively eliminate the demand requirement altogether, but presumably the board would be entitled to treat
the complaint as a demand rather than as a complaint and to exercise its own judgment accordingly. The same
result could be achieved by dismissing the derivative complaint without prejudice. Thus, the court was proba-
bly correct in ruling as it did. Cf Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (finding that FRCP
23.1 should be interpreted literally and by its terms does not require demand if demand would be futile). The
defendants also argued that the derivative actions should be dismissed, because the defendants were actively
pursuing the same claims by virtue of their cooperation in various regulatory actions. The plaintiffs argued that
the fund trustees' participation in the regulatory settlement process was immaterial because "the regulators
have not asserted any claim to recover any damages caused to any Funds by the faithless fiduciaries." In re Mut.
Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d at 875 n.5 (quoting Derivative Plaintiffs' Omnibus Opposition Mem. 36).
Although the court did not reject either argument, Judge Motz noted that recovery by the fund would be
problematic. Id.
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reasons Judge Motz pointed out in MDL 1586, among others, this characterization
of the claim does not fit well in connection with a mutual fund:
Plaintiffs take the position that they are seeking recovery for the funds as enti-
ties, and they reject the concept of distributing the proceeds of any recovery to
persons who held mutual fund shares during the period that late trading and
market timing activities were occurring. Rather, plaintiffs contend that this is
like any other derivative action in which any recovery becomes the asset of the
corporate entity on behalf of which the action is instituted. Mutual funds, how-
ever, are quite different from other corporate entities. They do not have assets
of their own but merely hold in trust securities (and cash) for the benefit of the
mutual fund shareholders. Therefore, any recovery made by a mutual fund in
a derivative action would merely increase the proportionate value of the invest-
ment of the persons who hold shares in the fund at the time of the recovery.
That result would be, at best, paradoxical because it would compensate per-
sons who were not harmed at all by late trading or market timing activities
(current shareholders who did not own shares when these activities were occur-
ring) while failing to compensate others who were injured (persons who owned
shares when late trading and market activities occurred but later sold them).
Likewise, there would be no just or logical relationship between the compensa-
tion paid and the harm suffered as to persons who are current shareholders but
who owned shares for different periods of time (or in amounts different from
their present holdings) while late trading and market timing activities
occurred.
Plaintiffs respond by saying this is always the case when a derivative action
is filed. However, in the usual circumstance, the stock of a corporate entity on
whose behalf the derivative recovery is made is valued on the basis of a wide
variety of factors (many of which are intangible), and the entity does not serve
simply as a pass-through of net asset value to its shareholders.
Furthermore, even to the extent that a recovery made in a derivative action
filed on behalf of an ordinary corporate entity may (by increasing share price)
indirectly redound to the benefit of its then current stockholders (as distinct
from the stockholders at the time of the occurrence of the wrongs giving rise to
the recovery), the disconnection between those who were harmed and those
who were benefited is less dramatic (and, as a matter of economic theory, does
not exist at all). That is because a potential recovery in a derivative action is
itself an asset of the corporation. Therefore, when a person, who owned stock in
a corporate entity when wrongful acts giving rise to a derivative action or
potential derivative action occurred, sells that stock before the derivative action
is resolved, he makes the decision to accept a market price for the stock that
presumably takes into account the value of the potential recovery. In contrast,
the net asset value of a mutual fund is based entirely upon the underlying
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securities (and cash) in which the fund is invested and not upon the value of
any chose in action held by the fund itself as an independent entity. Therefore,
when a mutual fund shareholder sells his shares prior to the resolution of a
derivative action, the price he receives includes no component for any potential
recovery in that action.69
Despite this cogent analysis, Judge Motz did not rule on whether the claims were
direct or derivative. Rather, he dismissed the derivative claims, with one minor
exception, because the plaintiffs had failed to make the required demand on the
boards of directors of the funds involved.7 °
The Case for Direct Action
The considerations Judge Motz outlined in MDL 1586 suggest that the claims
should be seen as direct. Indeed, he may have understated the case. There are addi-
tional good arguments for that position. First, as Judge Motz points out, there is a
vital difference between an investment in a mutual fund and an investment in an
ordinary business corporation. With an ordinary business corporation, an investor
who wants to cash out must sell his shares in the market. With a mutual fund, an
investor who wants to cash out sells his shares back to the fund, which has prom-
ised to buy them daily at NAV. Indeed, industry rules effectively block the investor
from access to any other market for the shares.7 There is no market price.72 The
obligation to buy back the shares is a matter of contract with the fund. The harm
that comes from selling at too low a price is one that comes, in effect, from a
breach of that contract between the fund and the investor. That is a classic direct
claim."
69. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d at 875 n.5.
70. Id. at 875.
71. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 709 (1975) (finding no violation of
antitrust law in this arrangement).
72. In contrast, exchange-traded funds trade throughout the day and their prices vary from NAV as a
result of market forces. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 21, § 16.6.
73. For example, a controversy relating to the rights of a particular class of stock as against other classes of
stock and whether the corporate action has inappropriately favored one class over the other is classically direct
in nature. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.01 cmt. c (1994). (To be
sure, such an action may also be seen as one in which different stockholders suffer different injuries, but Tooley
notwithstanding, the claim is still direct in nature.) The law relating to closely held corporations is also instruc-
tive in this connection. The essential feature of a closely held corporation is the lack of a market for shares. See
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975). Because of the lack of a
market and because there is little danger of duplicative actions by multiple stockholders, the courts have ruled
that minority stockholders have a direct right of action against the corporation and other stockholders in
connection with claims arising as a result of improper unequal treatment. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.01 cmt. e (1994). Cf. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464,
475- 76 (Cal. 1969) (holding that the exclusion of minority stockholders from access to public market for their
shares constitutes breach of fiduciary duty).
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Second, if an action is treated as derivative, it could ultimately lead to speculative
trading in fund shares. Because funds must be sold at NAV, the value of an award
or settlement will not be included in fund shares until the cash is received. Thus,
newcomers might be able to capture a share of the gain by buying fund shares
when the award or settlement is announced but before the money is actually trans-
ferred to the fund.74
Finally, a mutual fund is in essence a pass-through entity. Each investor has
rights a partner would have in connection with a claim of a partnership against a
wrongdoer. Although the partnership can sue as an entity, the recovery is ulti-
mately added to the partnership account of each partner. Arguably, the distinction
between direct claims and derivative claims breaks down in the context of a part-
nership.75 Similarly, the value of mutual fund shares is that they constitute a direct
claim on fund assets. Thus, to award any portion of the recovery to the fund with-
out allocating it in some way to individual investors is nonsense. Moreover, an
award to the fund will end up in the accounts of individual investors in any event
because of the nature of mutual fund shares. Thus, the best reason for treating
these claims as direct is that a derivative recovery will become a direct recovery one
way or the other. Although one must pay homage to the distinction between direct
and derivative claims, it does not follow that the distinction makes any real sense in
this context.
The Case for Derivative Action
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, there are also problems with treating
these claims as direct. First, it is not clear that holdover fund investors have stand-
ing to sue under Rule 10b-5, because they did not trade.76 The court in MDL 1586
did rule that in the context of claims based on abusive trading of mutual fund
shares, the requirement that one be a buyer or seller in order to have standing to
74. This problem can be avoided by ordering individual recovery even though the action is derivative.
Although there is substantial authority for such a solution, many courts are reluctant to order individual
recovery in a derivative action as a matter of principle that such a remedy is simply inconsistent with the idea
of a derivative action. See supra note 57.
75. Compare UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 405, cmt. n.2 (1997), with UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1001
(2001). In addition, § 1101 of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act provides that a member "may
maintain an action in the right of the company if the members or managers having authority to do so have
refused to commence the action or an effort to cause [them] to commence the action is not likely to succeed."
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 1101, 6A U.L.A. 646 (2003). Delaware law is similar. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 6, § 18-
1001 (2005). In other words, the general rule in connection with pass-through entities is that in appropriate
circumstances, beneficial owners may enforce claims of the entity directly for the benefit of the entity and
fellow beneficial owners. Moreover, as a technical matter, a mutual fund may opt to distribute a pro rata share
of its assets in kind rather than paying a selling stockholder in cash. Finally, mutual funds are treated essentially
as pass-through entities for federal income tax purposes. See I BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS 1 1.06111 (7th ed. 2000). See also IRS, Publication 17, at
209 (2004) (addressing non-publicly traded funds).
76. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730- 31 (1975) (holding that only buyers
and sellers have standing to sue under Rule If0b-5).
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sue under Rule 10b-5 does not apply.77 But it is far from clear that that position will
stand up on appeal.7"
Second, if the claims are direct, they are presumably claims directly against the
fund. In other words, it would seem that the fund should pay in the first instance,
although it would presumably have a claim against those who participated in the
abusive trading. It is not at all clear that a fund investor has standing to maintain a
direct action against other investors, the fund adviser, third party brokers, or fund
directors and officers without joining the fund as a defendant. Indeed, it is not
altogether clear that fund investors have any claim against third parties even if the
fund is joined.79
Third, one major disadvantage of treating these claims as direct rather than de-
rivative is that it may result in the distribution of thousands of checks for small
amounts of money-checks that may never be cashed. A derivative recovery, on
the other hand, would likely take the form of a significant contribution of cash to
the fund that the fund would then be able to invest. In short, it would presumably
be much cheaper for the action to proceed as a derivative action.
Clearly, it would make more sense for selling fund investor plaintiffs to recover
directly against the wrongdoers, but it is not clear that they have standing to do so.
The fund itself clearly does have standing to recover against the wrongdoers. More-
over, the fund itself may recover the entire amount of the ill-gotten gains, including
amounts extracted from both sellers and holders of fund shares. Thus, it would
seem preferable for the fund to seek recovery. But that suggests that the action
should be characterized as derivative. We have now come full circle."s
77. On the same day that the MDL 1586 court dismissed the derivative claims (save one), the court denied
a motion to dismiss the (direct) class claims arising under Rule lob-5 and ICA § 36(b) while dismissing various
claims based on the 1933 Act, other sections of the ICA, and fiduciary duty under state law. In re Mut. Funds
Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 872 (D. Md. 2005). The court held that the surviving claims could proceed
under Rule 10b-5 even as to investors who held (but did not trade) fund shares during the fraud period. Id. at
854- 55, 872 (citing In re Alger, Columbia, Janus, MFS, One Group, and Putnam Mut. Fund Litig., 320 F. Supp.
2d 352, 355 (D. Md. 2004)).
78. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 164 L. Ed. 2d 179, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 2497, 74
U.S.L.W. 4167 (2006) (state law fiduciary duty claim that investor was induced to retain stocks by fraudulent
investment advice preempted under SLUSA).
79. If the claim is characterized as one involving participation in a fraud, it is presumably cognizable, but
if it is more in the nature of aiding and abetting, it cannot be maintained as a private cause of action. See
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). See also Munford v. Valuation Research Corp.,
98 F.3d 604, 613 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (questioning whether a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty exists under state law).
80. It is also possible that a court may decide that some claims are direct and other claims are derivative.
For example, claims relating to late trading and market timing, both of which dilute the shares of other inves-
tors, may be classified as direct, given that they have a direct effect on fund value (and certainly so for those
who sold during the fraud period). Claims relating to additional fees paid to advisers as a result of investments
made by offending traders may be classified as derivative in that they relate to expenses of running the fund
and not directly to the value of the asset pool. (The analysis would seem to be the same whether the action is
against the offending traders, the fund adviser, or the fund directors.) Undoubtedly, such a compromise solu-
tion is attractive precisely because it is a compromise, but that is no argument in itself. Moreover, the argument
that because of the peculiar structure of mutual funds, management fees are paid out of the fund and represent
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A Hybrid Solution
No matter how these actions are classified, there are significant logistical difficulties
in managing recovery. If the action is treated as derivative and the fund recovers,
those who sold their shares during the fraud period will recover nothing even
though they would seem to have the strongest claims. Moreover, recovery by the
fund, rather than individual recovery which seems to be disfavored by the courts,
could lead to speculative purchases of fund shares before the recovery is reflected in
NAV and could significantly dilute the effective recovery of holdover investors. Even
in the absence of speculation, the effect of the recovery will be diluted by the nor-
mal advent of new investors, at least if the fund is growing. On the other hand, if
the action is treated as direct, it may be argued that only investors who sold during
the fraud period may recover, as is the normal rule in an ordinary securities-fraud
class action. That would deprive more conservative buy-and-hold investors of any
recovery even though their shares will forever be damaged as a result of the earlier
diversion of fund assets. Again, one might appeal to the ultimate pass-through
character of mutual funds as a rationale for granting all investors standing as class
members.8 '
a drain on asset value rather than some form of dilution simply proves too much. To be sure, most investors
think of a fund and its company adviser as one. Indeed, commentators have noted that investors tend to view
funds as products rather than services and that this perception has had a significant effect on investor attitudes
toward fund governance. Remarks of Alan Palmiter; remarks of Frank Partnoy. The reality, however, is that
adviser compensation reduces the value of the fund in the same way that trading losses do. Moreover, one
might argue by the same logic that a stockholder action challenging option-based executive compensation as
excessive is direct, whereas an action challenging an excessive cash bonus is derivative.
81. It is not clear, however, that it is necessary to do so if one proceeds on a state-law theory of breach of
fiduciary duty owed directly to fund stockholders by the fund board of directors. See Malone v. Brincat, 722
A.2d 5, 14-15 (Del. 1998); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988). But see Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 164 L. Ed. 2d 179, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 2497, 74 U.S.L.W. 4167
(2006) (state law fiduciary duty claim that investor was induced to retain stocks by fraudulent investment
advice preempted under SLUSA). The court also dismissed state-law fiduciary-duty claims relating to failure to
disclose material facts on the grounds that such claims were not limited to nontrading fund investors and were
thus preempted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig. 384 F.
Supp. 2d at 872 (citing Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Star. 3227
(1998)). The court permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint on behalf of nontrading investors but
cautioned that such claims would be improper if they involved fraud or misrepresentation. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court held that a claim by an investor that he had been induced not to sell Internet stocks by his
investment adviser in violation of state-law fiduciary duty was in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities and thus preempted under SLUSA. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 164 L. Ed. 2d
179, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 2497, 74 U.S.L.W. 4167 (2006). See also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478
(7th Cir.2005), cert. granted, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6 (Jan. 6, 2006) (holding that claims by mutual fund holder
based on late trading and market timing are preempted by SLUSA). Nevertheless, it would seem that nontrad-
ing plaintiffs may have a claim sounding in contract that should survive preemption under SLUSA. Indeed, it is
the fact that mutual fund investors have a direct contractual right to sell their shares back to the fund corpora-
tion that ultimately justifies treatment of these claims as direct rather than derivative. See Tooley v. Donaldson,
Lufin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). The same theory may save the claims of nontrading
plaintiffs from ultimate dismissal for lack of standing to sue. As holders of shares in a mutual fund, they are
entitled to cash out on demand at NAV. Thus, although a given holder will not realize the harm until he sells
his shares, it is certain that he will do so when he does sell. This would seem to distinguish the instant situation
from that in Blue Chip Stamps, where the plaintiffs claimed that they had been induced not to buy in the first
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW120
RICHARD A. BOOTH
There is, however, an elegant middle solution. The above problems can all be
avoided if the fund recovers cash from the wrongdoers and then creates new fund
shares in some number that would exactly offset the recovery so that it would have
no effect on then-current NAV. The new shares would then be divided into daily
portions equal to the losses from abusive trades on each day during the fraud pe-
riod. Finally, the daily portions would be allocated to individual fund investors in
proportion to the number of shares owned on each day during the fraud period. 2
Holdover investors will presumably see a slight increase in the number of shares
they own at the end of the process. Investors who cashed out during the fraud
period will have their accounts constructively reopened to receive their allocation
of the new shares. Presumably, the shares in those accounts will then be redeemed,
and the former fund investors will receive the cash value of their award.
The procedure would serve both holders and sellers and would have no effect on
NAV. It would also avoid the danger of speculation that might go with derivative
recovery. 3 The expense of administering the recovery would be minimal, because it
would all be handled by a simple journal entry crediting each account with a few
additional shares or fractions thereof. And the costs associated with distributing
many small checks would be kept to a minimum. Finally, the funds themselves
should favor this procedure because the recovery would effectively be reinvested in
the fund.
place, thus giving rise to serious doubts about whether they would have bought had they known the truth. 421
U.S. at 726-27. This theory need not conflict with federal law relating to fraud. For example, the failure to
disclose late trading and market timing arguably prevented plaintiffs from seeking injunctive relief to enforce
their contractual claims. The question remains, however, whether the state-law duty of candor gives rise to a
direct or derivative claim, that is, whether it is a duty that is owed directly to the stockholders. Intuitively, it is
difficult to see how the duty of candor could not be one that is owed to the stockholders directly. It makes little
sense as a duty running to the corporation. The Second Circuit faced a similar issue in Strougo v. Bassini, 282
F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002). Strougo involved a dosed-end fund that had issued to its existing investors nontrans-
ferable rights to purchase additional shares at a discount from the then-current share value. Id. at 165-66. The
plaintiff sought to maintain a class action against the fund board of directors on the theory that the board of
directors owed a fiduciary duty directly to the investors, as well as to the corporation. Id. at 166. Holding that
the claims were properly characterized as direct (even though based on the issue of shares at a discount), the
court addressed the question whether, under Maryland law, an actionable fiduciary duty runs from the board
of directors to the stockholders of a corporation. Id. at 173-74. Clearly, there must be duties that run directly
to stockholders. Otherwise, there would never be occasion for a direct action. On the other hand, one might
characterize many such duties, such as those involving voting rights, as contractual Thus, the narrow question
before the court was whether such duties are properly characterized as fiduciary. Ultimately, the court found
that a direct duty does in fact exist. Id. (citing Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 648 (Md. 1985);
Waller v. Waller, 49 A.2d 449, 454 (Md. 1946)). The court also held that the duty is actionable, noting that it
would be peculiar for a legal duty to be nonactionable. Id. But see Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders,
and Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAW. 429 (1998) (discussing
the supposed duty to maximize stockholder value).
82. Needless to say, one would need to make appropriate adjustments for the shares involved in abusive
trading schemes by excluding such shares from the allocation. In addition, the allocation should proceed day to
day from the beginning to the end of the fraud period, because investors who held during the entire period
would have seen compounded gains and losses during the fraud period.
83. It would be important to announce the plan as early as possible during the course of the litigation in
order to prevent speculation in fund shares.
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The remaining question is how to achieve this solution. Is this remedy one that
goes with a direct class action? Or is it one that goes with a derivative action? Or is
there some other procedure by which this remedy is possible? Note that one of the
factors to be considered in deciding whether an action is direct or derivative is the
nature of the recovery at stake. Thus, although it is a bit odd to formulate a remedy
before making a decision on the nature of an action, there is some authority for
doing so.
The simplest procedure would be for the fund to sue the wrongdoers and then to
allocate the proceeds by issuing new shares without outside interference. Of course,
the fund is under no obligation to do so, although one might argue that fiduciary
duty requires it. Moreover, in the absence of pending litigation against the fund,
this solution would probably require a vote of the fund investors. On the other
hand, a fund could presumably undertake some such plan in connection with a
settlement agreement and probably without a fund investor vote, because under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), court approval is required for settlement
of both class actions and derivative actions.8 4 Thus, under this alternative it makes
no difference how the action is characterized.
A second alternative is to treat the action as derivative. 5 With a derivative action,
the plaintiff can direct the litigation against the entire array of potential defendants,
including other investors, brokers, the fund adviser, and the directors and officers
of the fund itself. But it is not clear that the derivative plaintiff can seek to compel
the fund to allocate the recovery according to the plan. In other words, it is not
clear that one has standing as a derivative plaintiff to compel the fund to issue new
shares as a way of distributing the recovery. Such a remedy seems more direct than
derivative, in that the fund itself has no interest in how its own shares are allocated.
On the other hand, as noted previously, many courts treat claims arising in con-
nection with dilution as derivative, and the remedy proposed is one that is similar
in many ways to a remedy one might imagine in such a connection. Moreover, a
derivative action has traditionally been seen as one at equity, because, in effect, it
amounts to an action to compel the corporation to sue some wrongdoer. 6 A court
of equity has the power to fashion any necessary remedy. Thus, it would seem that
a derivative plaintiff could seek to compel the issue of new shares to allocate the
recovery.
A third alternative is to treat the action as a direct class action against the fund.
The problem with this alternative is that it suggests-by analogy to ordinary secur-
ities-fraud class actions-that the fund itself is a defendant and might in theory be
held liable to fund investors who sold during the fraud period. That is, after all, the
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
85. The problem is that in MDL 1586, the derivative actions have been dismissed or are likely to be
dismissed consistent with the decision of August 25, 2005. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 873
(D. Md. 2005).
86. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970).
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normal remedy in a run-of-the-mill securities-fraud class action involving a pub-
licly traded corporation that withholds bad news while innocent investors buy the
stock. The situation is different, however, in a case involving abusive trading of
mutual fund shares. In such a case, fund investors already own the shares. They
realize the loss when they sell shares because the value of the shares has been re-
duced by abusive trading schemes. And holdover investors suffer a loss that is
equally real because their investment going forward is effectively reduced as a result
of the extraction of fund value by abusive trading. To hold the fund itself liable to
sellers would compound the injury to holders. On the other hand-and again by
analogy to ordinary securities-fraud class actions-it would seem odd for fund
investors to sue the primary wrongdoers without also suing the fund itself. Fund
investors have no direct relationship with the wrongdoers. An action by fund inves-
tors against third parties without joining the fund itself would seem to be nothing
but a closet derivative action. 7
There is, as it turns out, a simple solution to this problem as well. Although most
class actions seek money damages and proceed under FRCP 23(b)(3), there is an
alternative procedure available under FRCP 23(b)(2), which provides that an action
may be maintained as a class action if the "party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appro-
priate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole.""8 This provision would seem tailor-made for cases involving abu-
sive trading in mutual fund shares. Simply put, it permits a class action against a
fund for injunctive relief, including presumably an injunction requiring a defen-
dant fund to pursue claims based on abusive trading and to allocate recovery by
means of issuing new shares.8 9 It is difficult to imagine a better example of a case in
which the defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class. It is also worth noting that section 27 of the Exchange Act provides that
the federal courts have jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created [under the act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder."9
The bottom line is that it does not seem to matter much whether mutual fund
stockholder actions in connection with late trading and market timing are charac-
87. In the one case in which the issue has been addressed, the court dismissed the claims against two
funds, precisely on the grounds that holding them liable would compound the harm to holdover investors. See
In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 852 n.3 (D. Md. 2005). The court did not address the
question whether the plaintiffs could maintain the action in absence of the fund defendants.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
89. Id.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000). Admittedly, this argument suggests that all derivative actions could be prose-
cuted as direct actions under FRCP 23(b)(2) rather than under FRCP 23.1, thereby avoiding all sorts of proce-
dural problems such as the need to make demand on the board of directors. On the other hand, given that
FRCP 23(b)(2) permits only actions for injunctive or declaratory relief, it is subject to the full array of equitable
limitations, including presumably the imposition of a presuit demand requirement.
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terized as direct or derivative. What matters most is the remedy. And the ideal
remedy-recovery by the fund combined with the distribution of new shares
(rather than cash) to injured investors-can be achieved under either procedure. If
the actions are characterized as derivative, the court sitting as a court of equity can
fashion a remedy that includes the issue of new shares, and can do so without
resorting to individual recovery. If the actions are characterized as direct, they can
proceed as actions for injunctive relief under FRCP 23(b)(2), by which the fund
itself is in effect compelled to seek recovery and to distribute new shares to injured
stockholders.
CONCLUSION
The abusive trading strategies that came to light beginning in September 2003 have
shaken the faith of the investing public in mutual funds. This is a serious develop-
ment because it is vital for investors to diversify, and mutual funds are the primary
way by which investors do so. Although one might argue that securities fraud in
connection with the pricing of individual stocks is a zero sum event for diversified
investors, fraud in connection with the pricing of mutual funds constitutes real
financial harm for investors. Although it is irrational for an individual investor to
keep all of her eggs in one basket, there is nothing imprudent about keeping all of
one's eggs in a single, well-diversified mutual fund. Accordingly, mutual fund ad-
visers should be seen as fiduciaries of the highest order and held to the punctilio of
an honor most sensitive. Thus, it is crucial that we get it right in addressing the
harms suffered by mutual fund investors in connection with late trading and mar-
ket timing. Although it may take some time and further thought to institute the
necessary reforms in connection with mutual fund structure, the way to remedy the
financial harms suffered by fund investors seems fairly clear.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
